On September 5, 1862, General
Lee crossed his army over the Potomac into Western Maryland. It had taken him four months to drive Lincoln's armies out of Virginia and the effort
had left his soldiers staggering. He desperately needed to get them into the Shenandoah Valley, the only place within a radius of
sixty miles from his position, after the fierce battle at Manassas, where they could find subsistence,
rest, and reorganize. But, in turning his army back from the environs of Washington, it was
impossible for him to lead it directly across the Blue
Ridge into the Valley. Lincoln's
armies would quickly consolidate under McClellan's command again and move
immediately toward Richmond,
and he would have to hurry his soldiers across the wasteland of Northern Virginia to intercept them. Only one strategy
would keep the enemy away from Richmond
while he marched his army to the Valley and that was to move there indirectly,
Lee's decision to move the Army of Northern Virginia into Maryland arguably resulted in the greatest,
certainly the bloodiest, battle of the Civil War. Twelve days after General
Lee's army entered Maryland,
the Battle of Antietam was fought on Constitution Day. In the space of twelve
hours, over five thousand soldiers, blue and gray, lost their lives in action
and another twenty thousand were wounded. Soon after, General Lee's soldiers
were safely in the Shenandoah Valley, camped along the Opequon, where they
remained undisturbed until the end of October when they moved east across the
Blue Ridge to counter McClellan's movement toward Culpeper.
the end of the Civil War, generations of historians, as well as popular Civil
War writers, have uniformly espoused the view that the Battle of Antietam
happened by accident, that in entering Maryland General Lee had planned to
carry the war into Pennsylvania, drawing McClellan after him, but
someone—perhaps one of General Lee's division commanders, D.H. Hill—had
negligently lost a copy of Lee's general movement order, which allowed
McClellan to thwart Lee's plans and force him into battle at Sharpsburg. When
this question of accident is reexamined in light of all the evidence now
available, however, reasonable minds will recognize that the Battle of Antietam
probably happened by General Lee's design—a design that he formulated, in
collaboration with Stonewall Jackson, while they were camped at Frederick,
1. General Lee's Purpose in Tricking
1867, the then editor of the Richmond Examiner, E.A. Pollard, published a book
entitled, The Lost Cause.
In it, Pollard claimed that the loss of General Lee's movement order—Special
Order 191 found by a Union soldier in a field at Frederick Maryland on
September 13, 1862—happened because Confederate Major General Daniel Harvey
Hill, "in a moment of passion had thrown the paper to the ground."
Incensed by what he rightly perceived as a vicious slur on his military
reputation, D.H. Hill published in a popular magazine called The Land We
Love, in February 1868, an article entitled The Lost Dispatch.
In his article, Hill categorically denied having anything to do with the loss
of Special Order 191. In support of his denial he offered the indisputable fact
that he had in his possession a copy of the subject order, written in Stonewall
Jackson's hand.Jackson, Hill wrote,
"did not trust it to be copied by his adjutant, and with care, I carried
it in my pocket and did not trust it among my office papers."
Pollard's supposition that General Lee's headquarters staff had prepared a copy
of Special Order 191 for his attention, sending it to his camp by courier, Hill
offered the affidavit of his adjutant, William Ratchford, in which Ratchford
swore no such order arrived at Hill's headquarters.
In further negation of his culpability, Hill offered the fact that, upon
crossing the Potomac into Maryland at Cheek's Ford, his division had become
attached to the command of Stonewall Jackson and advanced to Frederick under
Jackson's command; as a consequence, Hill wrote, "we drew all of our
supplies and received all our orders for the next several days through
Jackson." From this fact Hill argued that "[o]fficial etiquette required
[Special Order 191] to be sent to me through Jackson."
"It [is] utterly incomprehensible that all orders should come through the
proper channels, except this one, the most important of all," he wrote.
rebutted Pollard's charge of negligence in the losing of Lee's order, Hill went
on to explain how the finding of the order induced McClellan to act in a manner
beneficial to Lee. The text of the order specified that, as of September 13th,
the main body of the Confederate Army, with all its supply, artillery, and
ammunition trains, would be waiting behind South Mountain at Boonesboro for the
detached commands of Jackson, McLaws, and Walker to return from the Virginia
side of the Potomac, where they had gone four days before on a mission.
Yet, in fact, on September 13th, the only rebel infantry force occupying
Boonesboro was D.H. Hill's lone division of five brigades. Proceeding the march
of Hill's division to the SouthMountain, General Lee, in
the company of Longstreet's command,
had camped at Boonesboro the night of September 10th as the order specified;
but, on the following morning, Lee had gone with Longstreet's command to Hagerstown, thirteen
miles to the northwest, ostensibly to gain possession of the town's supplies.
The army's trains accompanied the march of these troops, and, reaching the
vicinity of Hagerstown, the reserve artillery and ammunition trains, with much
of the supply trains, were turned on to the roads leading to Williamsport and,
by September 13th, they were crossing the Potomac, moving around toward
knowing on September 13th that the march of Lee's so-called "main
body" had marched on to Hagerstown,
McClellan assumed that he would encounter a dangerously strong body of rebel
troops as he passed over SouthMountain. As a
consequence of this thinking, he delayed attacking in earnest the position D.H.
Hill's division was defending—Turner's Gap on the road to Boonesboro—until he
had concentrated almost four of his five corps in front of the mountain pass.
"McClellan could have crushed my little squad in ten minutes but for the
caution inspired in him by the belief that [Lee's main body] was there,"
In addition to this McClellan had another good reason to cautiously approach
the South Mountain, Hill offered—he had to worry that Jackson had returned from
Martinsburg, where Lee's lost order specified he was sent, and was lurking
somewhere on the other side of the mountain.
these points, D.H. Hill's position is plainly correct. The text of Special
Order 191 unambiguously specifies that Longstreet's command, with the army
trains, was to camp at Boonesboro, and that Stonewall Jackson's command was to
cross the Potomac and "take possession of the Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad at Martinsburg capturing the garrison there," and then return to
Maryland to join Lee's "main body," either at Boonesboro or
As Hill put it in The Lost Dispatch, "the apprehension that [Jackson] had returned
from Martinsburg, as directed by Lee's order, and which he had time to do, made
McClellan still more guarded in his approaches."
The inference to be drawn from McClellan's reaction to reading the lost order's
text, Hill's article implied, was that General Lee had used the order as a ruse
of this General Lee quickly responded with a curt denial. At the time The
Lost Dispatch was published, D. H. Hill had sent a copy to General Lee in Lexington, Virginia.
At that time Lee was acting as President of Washington College,
and he soon found himself drawn into conversation about Hill's article with
various persons connected to the college faculty.
After these conversations occurred, Lee wrote a personal letter to D.H. Hill,
on February 21, 1868.
letter, professing to have no knowledge of how the order was lost,
General Lee took issue with three conclusions Hill had made in his article.
First, as to the procedural anomaly of Lee's headquarters staff supposedly
sending a copy of the order directly to D.H. Hill, Lee wrote, without offering
any objective basis—"[I]t was proper in my opinion that a copy of the
order should be sent to you by the adjt General."
Second, in his article, Hill had written in italics: "In going to Harper's
Ferry from Martinsburg instead of returning to Boonesboro, Jackson acted on his own responsibility and
in violation of Lee's order."
To this, General Lee replied that Jackson
was "by verbal instructions" placed in command of the expedition
"to dislodge the Federal troops occupying Martinsburg and Harper's
As verification of his statement, General Lee offered a quotation from Jackson's official report
of his operations: "In obedience to instructions from the Commg Genl, and
for the purpose of capturing the Federal forces and stores then at Martinsburg
and Harper's Ferry, my command left the vicinity of FrederickCity
on the 10th".
Lee's effort at rebutting the inference of duplicity Hill's article implies,
falls flat when compared to the text of the lost order. No doubt Jackson did
receive verbal instructions from General Lee to go to Harper's Ferry—at the
time they were known to have conferred together in private—but
the indisputable fact remains that Jackson was in possession of a written order
(albeit in his own hand) which specified that he march his command to Martinsburg,
not to Harper's Ferry.
And, indisputably, a penciled copy of that particular order came into
George McClellan's possession.
bolster his rebuttal of Hill's inference, General Lee claimed in his letter
that the loss of the order was "a great calamity" to his campaign,
writing that he had "supposed there would have been time for [the
execution of Jackson's verbal orders] and for the army to have been reunited
before Genl. McClellan could cross the South Mountains."
Why did he suppose this? His letter offers as his reason that "Genl.
Stuart who was on the line of the Monocacy reported that Genl McClellan had
and was advancing very slowly with an extended front, covering the roads to
Washington and Baltimore." But the question is not how slow McClellan was
moving before he read the lost order, but how slow he was moving after he read
it. What possible basis did General Lee possess to think McClellan's advance from
Frederick would be so slow that Harper's Ferry could be overrun (or the
garrison induced to surrender), and Lee's detached columns reconcentrated in
Maryland before McClellan's army came into the Cumberland Valley? Lee's letter
to Hill does not say.
time he drafted the lost order, what in fact did General Lee know? On September
9th, at Frederick, he was informed by Stuart that McClellan's army was
beginning to march westward from Rockville on a broad front: the right wing
under Burnside's command—Reno's and Hooker's corps—marching on the National
Road so as to block an enemy advance that might materialize in the direction of
Baltimore; McClellan's left wing, composed of Franklin's corps, supported by
Couch's division, marching west on the roads close to the Potomac so as to
block an enemy advance in the direction of Washington. And his center, composed
of Sumner's corps, the 12th corps, and Fitz John Porter's corps, was marching
on the Georgetown
turnpike leading to Urbana
twenty-five miles away. From this, Lee knew that McClellan was expecting to be
attacked by the rebel army as his front advanced, and as long as he thought
that he would proceed forward cautiously. Once, though, McClellan realized that
the enemy was retreating instead of advancing, Lee could expect that his
defensive-minded approach would shift to an offensive-minded one and the
velocity of his advance would accelerate. To the mind of any competent general,
an enemy in flight poses hardly the same threat as an enemy operating on the
the depleted ranks of his army and the sorry condition of his supplies, General
Lee, even as aggressive as he was, knew he could not avoid retreating from Frederick. For, to make a
stand on the line of the Monocacy, he would need twice, if not three times, the
strength he possessed. To keep McClellan's vast array out of his rear, he would
have to extend his front to cover the National Road on his left and the mouth
of the Monocacy on his right—a length of front entirely beyond the capacity of
his army. Knowing, then, that retreat from Frederick was mandatory, General Lee must
have canvased his map in the company of Jackson,
looking for an available location where natural barriers would make the turning
of his flanks impossible. Plainly, he saw that that place was behind the Antietam at Sharpsburg—where
he would have a three mile front to defend, the shoulders of which would be
pressed against the folds of the Potomac. But
to fight a general battle in this position, the rebel army required a secure
line of retreat to Winchester,
in the Shenandoah Valley, and the Union
garrison at Harper's Ferry—10,000 soldiers and 1,200 cavalrymen—posed an
unacceptable threat to it.
this reason, General Lee gave Jackson
verbal instructions to capture Harper's Ferry and rejoin the rest of the army
Making the decision to send Jackson,
in conjunction with the divisions of McLaws's, R.H. Anderson, and Walker, to
neutralize the Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry garrisons, however, did not solve
the problem ofthe Union Army's advance.
Once McClellan reached Frederick and found it abandoned by the enemy, he would
certainly learn that the enemy had crossed the Potomac into Virginia and this
fact would induce him to rush his army directly toward Harper's Ferry in order
to get a powerful force quickly into the Shenandoah Valley, to pursue or break
up the enemy's retreat in the direction of Winchester.
The three rebel divisions remaining with Lee in Maryland—D.R. Jones's, John Hood's, and D.H.
Hill's—could hardly be expected to paralyze the advance of McClellan's five
corps toward Harper's Ferry. Something else was required to have any chance of
doing that. All of this General Lee ignored in his letter to Hill.
letter does offer an argument of sorts for the proposition that McClellan's
reaction to reading the lost order placed the Rebel Army in grave peril. The
letter quotes a message McClellan had written to William Franklin at 6:20 p.m.,
on September 13th (Franklin was then encamped at Buckystown.); but McClellan's
message proves, not disproves, Hill's case that reading the lost order induced
him to do exactly the opposite of what he would have done if the order had not
"I have now full information as to movements and intentions of the enemy. Jackson has crossed the Upper Potomac to capture the garrison at Martinsburg, and
cut off Miles's retreat towards the west. A division on the south side of the Potomac (Walker's)
was to carry LoudounHeights, and cut off his
retreat in that direction. McLaws, with his own division and the division of
R.H. Anderson, was to move by Boonesboro and Rohrersville to carry MarylandHeights. . . . Longstreet was to move to
Boonesboro, and there halt with the reserve trains, D.H. Hill to form the rear
guard, Stuart's cavalry to bring up stragglers etc."
George McClellan could read Lee's English correctly; as a result, he formulated
a plan of action which placed his main body in front of where Lee's lost
order placed the rebel main body.
But while his main body was composed of thirty brigades he did not know that
Lee's was composed of only fourteen.
As a consequence of this, McClellan assigned but three divisions to advance
against the two rebel divisions, under McLaws's command, which had marched to MarylandHeights, ostensibly "to endeavor to
capture Harper's Ferry."
Direction, not speed,
is the key to understanding Lee's trick with the lost order. If he had not read
the lost order, a reasonable general in McClellan's circumstances would have
directed his main body on Rohrersville, instead of Boonesboro, with the plan of
relieving Miles at Harper's Ferry and then pressing after the enemy wherever
found. Through the 11th and 12th McClellan had received many reports that told
him the enemy was apparently making a headlong retreat across the river: From
Harper's Ferry, Colonel Miles telegraphed that a heavy column of troops was
passing through the Cumberland Valley in the direction of Hagerstown;
from Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin came the advice that "Jackson is
crossing at Williamsport and probably the whole army will be drawn into
wiring McClellan that the enemy was crossing the Potomac,
pleaded with McClellan at the time—"Please do not let him get off without
In reaction to these reports, on the 12th at , McClellan wired Lincoln's general-in-chief, Henry Halleck,
"My columns are pushing on rapidly to Frederick. From all I gather, secesh is
skedalleling, and I don't think I can catch him unless he is really moving into
Pennsylvania. . . I
begin to think he is making off to get out of the scrape by recrossing the
river at Williamsport. . . I shall endeavor to cut off his retreat. My
movements tomorrow will be dependant upon information received during the
By this time, the advance guard of McClellan's right wing had entered Frederick.
the circumstances known to McClellan the evening of the 12th, there was only
one way his army could possibly have caught the enemy in retreat: Its main
body—at least three, if not four, of its five corps—must march on the morrow in
the direction of Crampton's Gap in the South Mountain, pass into the narrow
enclave called Pleasant Valley and move in the direction of the Potomac; the
remainder of the army to march west on the National Road to guard the main
body's right flank and rear from possible attack coming from the direction of
Turner's Gap, six miles to the north of Crampton's. Once on the Virginia side
of the river, McClellan's columns would then march into the Shenandoah Valley
and converge on the enemy's line of retreat toward Winchester, with the rear
guard of the army, passing Turner's Gap into the Cumberland Valley, closing up
by passing the Potomac at Shepherdstown.
13th, however, having reached Frederick
and read Lee's lost order, McClellan did exactly the opposite of this. As
General Lee's letter to Hill only partially quotes, he messaged to Franklin, at , "The whole of
Burnside's command march. . . followed by Sumner, the 12th Corps and Sykes
(division of Porter's corps) upon Boonesboro to carry that position. . . .
Without waiting for the whole of [Couch's] division to join you, you will move
at day-break by Jefferson and Burkittsville upon the road to Rohrersville. . .
in order to cut off the retreat of or destroy McLaws's command. . . If you
effect this. . .
you will then return to Boonesboro if the main column has not succeeded in its
attack. If it has succeeded, take the road to Sharpsburg and Williamsport, in order to cut off the retreat
of Hill and Longstreet towards the Potomac, or
to prevent the repassage of Jackson.
My general idea is to cut the enemy in two."
his choice of deployment, George McClellan might have achieved his objective of
cutting the enemy in two. Instead, by late evening on the 14th, he found
himself only in possession of the SouthMountain gaps, and the
next morning—Harper's Ferry having surrendered—his main body took possession of
Boonesboro and cautiously began to follow the enemy toward Sharpsburg. Induced by Lee's lost order not
only to direct the weight of his forces away from Crampton's Gap—the gateway to
Pleasant Valley and the Potomac crossing at Harper's Ferry—but also to delay
launching an overpowering attack on D.H. Hill's position at Turner's Gap, McClellan
gave Lee time to clear his rear of the enemy and concentrate for battle behind
Lee's Order Was "Lost."
to the historical evidence, sometime close to on September
13, 1862, a Union soldier, probably Private Barton Mitchell of the
27th Indiana Regiment, Gordon's Brigade, 12th Corps, was engaged in stacking
arms with his comrades at Frederick,
when he discovered Lee's lost order lying on the ground. The first public
description of this occurrence was given by Silas Colgrove, the 27th Indiana's war time
colonel, to the editors of the Century Magazine, in 1886.
Colgrove wrote: "Within a few minutes of halting, the order was brought to
me by First Sergeant John M. Bloss and Private B.W. Mitchell, of Company F, who
stated that it was found by Private Mitchell near where they stacked arms. When
I received the order it was wrapped around three cigars, and Private Mitchell
stated that it was in that condition when found by him."
According to his letter to the Century editors, Colgrove carried the found
order directly to the headquarters of the 12th Corps's temporary commander,
Alpheus S. Williams, and handed it to Williams's adjutant, Colonel Samuel E.
Pittman. Pittman showed it to Williams who signed a message to McClellan—"I
enclose a special order. . . which was found on the field. . . It is a document
By Williams's choice of language one may reasonably assume his message to
McClellan, along with the found order, was placed in an envelope. Pittman then
had a courier carry the documents to McClellan's headquarters and hand them to
McClellan's adjutant, Seth Williams.
When Lee's lost order was handed to McClellan he reportedly exclaimed in the
presence of civilians—"Now I know what to do."
General Lee's order was lost has been most often explained as happening by
accident; as the prolific civil war writer, Stephen W. Sears, most recently put
it: "Far and away the most likely explanation for the loss of order 191 is
also the simplest—that it was accidentally dropped by a courier from Lee's
headquarters while on his way to deliver it to D.H. Hill."
However, when the totality of the available evidence is marshalled, it
is impossible to ignore the probability that Special Order 191 was
intentionally lost by General Lee, in order to induce McClellan to throw the
weight of his army against South Mountain's Turner's Gap instead of Crampton's.
the practical situation General Lee's army was in, the relevant circumstances
that establish the probable truth of the matter are these: staff procedure, the
cigars, weather, the stationer's stamp, Lee's reaction to notice of the order's
loss, and, finally, the identity of the writer of McClellan's copy. From the
proof of these facts the conclusion necessarily follows that it is more likely
than not true that the order was dropped near Private Barton Mitchell's side,
by a civilian passing casually through the field the men of the 27th Indiana
Regiment were settling in to on September
whose positions placed them at General Lee's headquarters during the Antietam
Campaign fall into three distinct categories: the general staff of the army,
General Lee's personal staff, and those officers attached to his headquarters
who were field agents of the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office at Richmond. The members of
Lee's general staff—the chiefs of the various departments of his army such as
artillery, commissary, quartermaster etc—were not involved in the preparation,
record keeping and transmission of movement orders addressed to commanders of
infantry units. The members of Lee's personal staff and that of the Adjutant
General's attached staff had mixed involvement with the promulgation of such
orders. The names of the officers who composed Lee's personal staff at the time
are in order of descending rank: A.L. Long, Lee's military secretary, Walter
Taylor, aide and sometime adjutant, and aides Charles Marshall and Charles A.
Venable. The members of the attached Adjutant General's staff were Robert
Chilton, Assistant Adjutant General, and his aides, A.P. Mason and T.M.R.
Regulations for the Army of the Confederate States specify the following with
regard to "special orders." Such orders "relate to the march of
some particular corps" and "are not published to the whole
command." An "important special order must be read and approved by
the officer whose order it is, before it is issued by a staff officer."
Such orders are generally put "through the office of the Adjutant or Adjutant
and Inspector General of the Command" and they "are transmitted
through all intermediate commanders in the order of rank." In contrast to
"special" orders, "general" orders "announce. . .
whatever may be important to make known to the whole command."
"During marches and active operations, all orders will be either sent
direct to the troops, or the respective commanders will be informed when to
send to headquarters for them." "Copies of all orders of the
commanders of armies. . . will be forwarded at their dates, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, in separate series, on full sheets of letter paper
to the Adjutant and Inspector General's (General Samuel E. Cooper's)
office" in Richmond."
case of Lee's lost order, conformance with the substance of the regulations
quoted above was accomplished by General Lee's personal and attached staff
officers in the following manner. First, on September 9th, A.P. Mason wrote a
document that he entitled "Special Order 191," which contains the first
two paragraphs of the eventual full text of order 191. This two paragraph
document contains the actual signature of Robert H. Chilton and was addressed
to the Adjutant General's office in Richmond.
The obvious function of this document was to establish the fact that, on
September 9th, General Lee had ordered his long time aide, Walter Taylor, to
leave the army and travel to Virginia, ostensibly on a mission to dissuade
President Davis, who was then at Gordonsville attempting to come up to the
army, to go back to Richmond.
Second, at some unverifiable moment in time, A.P. Mason wrote the complete
official record copy of Special Order 191—the full text is ten paragraphs—into
Robert Chilton's bound letterbook. At the signature line of this document, A.P.
Mason wrote "Adjutant General."
Last, Lee's staff officer, Charles Marshall, beginning with the third
paragraph, wrote a copy of order 191 in ink. This document is plainly signed by
Robert H. Chilton. This document was enclosed with a letter, also written in Marshall's hand, dated
September 12th, and addressed by General Lee to President Davis. It was
delivered by courier to Davis.
When Davis fled
1865, the letter and enclosure traveled with him to Georgia where it was left for some
time in a trunk.
These three documents—A.P. Mason's two paragraph copy, Chilton's letterbook
copy, and Marshall's copy—constitute the only known copies of Special Order 191
created by the hand-writing of any member of General Lee's personal staff or
the Adjutant General's attached staff.
is little evidence that any copy of Special Order 191
was delivered by either a staff officer or an orderly to the subordinate
commanders who supposedly received it—Longstreet, Jackson, McLaws, Walker and D.H. Hill. Longstreet's chief of staff,
Moxley Sorrel, wrote, "[The order] was so full that when a copy came in my
possession I wondered what could be done with it in event of my falling into
the enemy's hands."
Longstreet, in an article published in 1886, in the Century Magazine, said about
the lost order only this—"Ordinarily, upon getting possession of such an
order, the adversary would take it as a ruse de guerre, but it seems
that General McClellan gave it his confidence."
In his autobiography published in 1896, however, he added this, "The copy
sent to me was carefully read, then used as some persons use a little cut of
tobacco, to be assured that others could not have the benefit of its
John Walker, whose division by the order was sent to LoudounHeights,
wrote, in an article in the Century Magazine,
that he received verbal orders while at Frederick
on the 9th, "to return to the mouth of the Monocacy and destroy the
aqueduct of the Chesapeake &
. . Retracing our steps toward the Potomac, at 10:00 p.m. of the 9th my
division arrived at the aqueduct [and] about 3:00 a.m. on the 10th went into
bivouac about two miles west of the Monocacy. Late in the afternoon a courier
from General Lee delivered me a copy of [order 191] directing me to cooperate
with Jackson and McLaws in the capture of Harper's Ferry." Finally, of the
four commanders, only Lafayette McLaws makes reference in his official report
to order 191, saying merely that he moved his command "in compliance"
with its requirements.
From these meager snippets of unsworn testimony, which constitute all that
exists in the record, it is a strain to draw more than that communications were
transmitted which gave to each commander an understanding of the role he was to
play in the movement about to commence. And two of the four, Longstreet and
Jackson, received their instructions from Lee directly.
Lee's staff officers, they tell us nothing about their personal
involvement in the creation and transmission of Special Order 191 to the field
commanders. The evidence shows that, of the officers on Lee's personal staff,
Charles Marshall was the one directly involved in creating the only copy of the
movement portion of the order that was signed by Robert Chilton. After the war,
frequent public appearances where he gave addresses on the subject of General
Lee's operations, and he prepared a manuscript which, after his death, became a
published book in 1927. Yet he never said or wrote anything which revealed his
direct knowledge about the matter.
In a letter
sent to D.H. Hill, in November 1867, Marshall
wrote, "How the order was lost I am wholly unable to conjecture. . . I can
only say that the army then not being organized into corps, it was a frequent
occurrence to communicate general orders for movements of the whole army
to divisions commanders. . . Such orders were usually copied by the staff, one
getting copied into the Confidential Book, to be copied into the general order
book post factum. They were sent out by orderlies who were required in cases of
moment to bring back envelopes or some other receipt from the officers to whom
they were sent."
In Marshall's manuscript, published as a book twenty years after his death by
British major general, Frederick Maurice, we are offered only this snippet: ".
. . as yet unexplained, a copy of the general order directing movement of the
whole army. . . fell into the hands of General McClellan."
Telling us that a custom existed, in the creation and transmission of orders,
tells us nothing we don't already know from reading the Confederate Army's
Regulations concerning the promulgation of orders.
Despite his direct involvement in writing the order copy Chilton signed,
Marshall tells us nothing about who, among Lee's staff officers, actually
supervised the recording and transmission of the order to the field.
Maurice became the editor of Marshall's
manuscript, in 1927, because he had two years before published a book about
Reading Maurice's book about Lee, Marshall's
eldest son, a New York
lawyer named H. Snowdon Marshall, wrote to Maurice in England and
offered his father's manuscript. In his letter Marshall's son said: "When I read your
book I heard my father talking again, and it seems to me that you divined a
trait in General Lee, which had a tendency to obscure the truth of history. . .
I am almost bewildered at the startling accuracy with which you found your path
through this camouflage of suppression of actual facts. I think [my father] had
in mind the feeling that to print indisputable facts which had been edited out
of the reports by General Lee would be a disloyalty."
Clearly, if any one besides Taylor
would have known who supervised the transmission of Special Order 191 to the
field, it was Charles Marshall; yet he chose to suppress that person's
other staff officers, too, refused to reveal who was responsible. Walter
Taylor, who most certainly would have known, had Lee not ordered him away from Frederick on the 9th,
published two books in his life time. In the first, published in 1878, he
wrote, "It was the custom to send copies of such orders, to the commanders
of separate corps or divisions only."
"It is impossible to explain how a copy addressed to D.H. Hill was thus
carelessly handled or lost."
In a footnote, though, Taylor
pointed the finger at Charles Venable, writing—Venable always contended
"One copy was sent directly to Hill from headquarters."
A.L. Long, writing in his biography of Lee, in 1886, repeated this same one
line quotation which he attributed to Venable.
For Charles Venable's part, nothing can be found in the historical record that
acknowledges this hearsay testimony as his own.
Robert Chilton, who signed the two copies of the order that were transmitted to
offers, unknowingly or not, information that reveals the probable truth of the
situation. In 1874, in writing a reply to an inquiring letter received from
Jefferson Davis, he wrote speaking of Hill: "Not having as I have told you
kept a journal, I could but give my recollection, viz. that they were sent to
all division commanders, entrusted with special duties, his at the Monocacy,
that couriers were required to bring back envelopes or other evidences of
delivery, failure in doing this to lead to a duplicate order to ensure its
receipt. . . but I could not of course say positively that I had sent any
particular courier to him after such a lapse of time."
Chilton's statement does speak to his knowledge of a courier being sent with
the order to Hill, but he puts Hill at the Monocacy when, in fact, it was John
Walker who was at the Monocacy and Walker acknowledges the receipt of his
marching orders by courier. Twelve years after the event, it seems obvious that
Chilton had apparently confused Hill with Walker.
Corroborating this is the evidence which shows General Lee was prone to give
verbal instructions directly to his subordinate commanders—he admits this,
Longstreet and Walker directly confirm it—and, thus, it is reasonable to
conclude that Walker, as the only officer of the five officers involved to be
actually detached from the main body of the army on the 9th, should have
received his marching orders by courier.
can reasonably be deduced, therefore, from the known evidence of General Lee's
staff procedure, is that Charles Marshall and A.P. Mason both wrote partial
copies of the text of the order 191, and that Robert H. Chilton signed his name
to them. Despite the fact that one or more of these three officers should
have known whether a copy of the general movement part of the order was actually
sent by an officer or orderly to D.H. Hill's headquarters, they offer us
nothing which reasonably can be relied on as evidence establishing this was
evidence is limited to proof of General Lee's staff procedure, the question of
whether the lost order was intentionally given to McClellan might reasonably be
in doubt, but there is evidence of undisputed facts which shifts the balance of
probability clearly in favor of a finding of intent. First, there is the fact
Colonel Colgrove, in 1886, stated that when he received the lost order from
Mitchell and Bloss it was "wrapped around three cigars." Colgrove's
credibility, here, is not diminished by any evidence of personal motive—he had
nothing to gain by fabricating the fact of the cigars. Bloss, who did have
something to gain—status as the actual finder of the order—repeatedly
corroborated Colgrove's statement in later years. McClellan's copy of the lost
order, as examined in the Library of Congress, clearly shows creases where it
had been folded for many years into a shape 3" X 5." Three cigars can
easily be laid side by side upon the surface of the folded paper and tied by a
string. Laid on the ground in this configuration, what Barton Mitchell would
have seen is the cigars and, if they looked unspoiled by the weather, how
likely would it have been for a reasonable person in his shoes not to
stoop to pick them up? The existence of the cigars could reasonably have had no
other purpose than to function as the means of attracting the Union soldier's
attention to the object lying near his feet. There simply can be no other
rational explanation: The suggestion that a courier, traveling the short
distance from Lee's headquarters camp to D.H. Hill's, would have connected
cigars somehow to the paper he was carrying to Hill smacks of incredibility.
there is the fact that the fields around Frederick
were inundated with rain from a storm all day on September 11th, lasting at
least into the night. Heros Von Borcke, JEB Stuart's chief of staff at the
time, wrote in 1866 of September 11th: "On the morning of the 11th we
received marching orders. . . . A steadily falling rain, which gave us some
discomfort in the saddle, added much to the dejection of spirits with which we
got in readiness to move away from Urbana."
According to a Union soldier, "steady rain" fell the evening of the
11th; "The storm stretched from Frederick
And Alfred Pleasonton, McClellan's cavalry commander is reported as saying,
"I entered Frederick
(on the 12th) about "
and "the roads were muddy from the previous day's rain.
If one assumes, as all civil war writers have, that the lost order was written
and sent by courier to Hill on September 9th, or at the latest the morning of
the 10th, the paper and cigars must have been lying in the field where they
were found for at least three, if not four, nights and three and a half days.
McClellan's copy of the order—as it exists today in the Library of Congress—shows
a small splotch on its surface; hardly sufficient evidence to infer the fact
that the paper had been exposed to the weather for such a length of time, much
less that it had been lying on the grass of a farm field during a twelve hour
the incredulity of arguing otherwise, is the fact that, on the 12th, the corps
of the Union Army pressed Stuart's cavalry divisions back from Sugar Loaf
Mountain, on the left of McClellan's advance from Urbana, and back from New
Market on the right—the advance guard of the 9th corps, in the early afternoon
of the 12th, tramped across the Monocacy on the National Road and skirmished
with Stuart's cavalry into the streets of Frederick. These troops went into
camp in the fields skirting the suburbs of the town and, by evening, were
joined by the divisions of Sumner's corps, which crossed the Monocacy between
the Urbana Turnpike and the National Road, and went into camp in the fields
adjacent to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad spur which runs into Frederick on
the south side of the National Road.
Given the muddy condition of the fields and the tramping of men and horses, the
movement of artillery and wagons, it is hardly reasonable to think Lee's lost
order could have survived in the condition it now exists. Therefore, the
evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion that the order could not have been
"lost" in the field until sometime after D.H. Hill's division
was long gone from Frederick.
Which means necessarily that it was not lost by a courier sent from Lee's
headquarters to Hill's.
weighing the scales, the documented reaction of Lee to news of the order's loss
cannot be ignored. Stephen Sears has written about this: "Remarkably,
there is no record of General Lee or anyone at his headquarters ever
investigating the matter, even after, some months later, it was learned that a
copy of S.O. 191 had reached enemy hands.Months later? The indisputable evidence is, by General Lee's own
admission, that he was on actual notice, no later than the early morning hours
of September 14th, that McClellan had the lost order in his hands.
Yet, the knowledge of this did not induce General Lee to order his "main
body" to flee Maryland
and rendezvous with the rest of his army in Virginia. Instead, he sent his trains across
the Potomac at Williamsport and marched in plain view of
Pleasonton's scouts across the CumberlandValley to support D.H.
Hill's defense of Turner's Gap. The inference from this is obvious: there was
nothing to investigate. He had tricked McClellan into thinking, throwing his
weight against Crampton's Gap would expose him to an attack from Lee's main
body at Turner's Gap, and now Lee had a good chance to draw McClellan into
battle at Sharpsburg.
C.Who Wrote McClellan's Copy?
the totality of the circumstances shown by the evidence so far, the presumption
must be that McClellan's copy was lost no earlier than on September 12th and no later than on September 13th. But who wrote
it? In resolving this question, the opinion of a so-called "handwriting
expert" is not required. As a federal court has explained,
there is a lack of empirical evidence that such an "expert" is any
more proficient than a lay person to correctly match handwriting samples,
because such opinions constitute "nothing more than a set of subjective
observations and little different from an unsupported opinion as to the fact of
authorship of a document."
Leaving the matter then to lay persons to decide, the first task is to examine
the writings of those most likely to have written the text of McClellan's copy;
under the standard theory of the order's accidental loss, these persons would
be the members of Lee's personal and attached adjutant general staff; i.e.,
A.L. Long, Walter Taylor, Charles Marshall, Charles Venable, Robert Chilton,
A.P. Mason and T.M.R. Talcott.
two-thirds majority of reviewers, who compare the handwriting of these
candidates with the writing of McClellan's copy, will probably distinguish the
latter example from the former examples easily. Since the handwriting of none
of these candidates compare favorably with the writing on McClellan's copy, the
search for its authorship must expand to include General Lee and his closest
confidants—Stonewall Jackson and JEB Stuart. Neither General Lee's handwriting
compare favorably with the writing on McClellan's copy.
This leaves JEB Stuart.
to his chief of staff, Heros Von Borcke, JEB Stuart's headquarters on the
afternoon of September 11th was located, "about a half mile from [Frederick]
at the farm of an old Irishman."
On the next day, the 12th, all of Stuart's cavalry, except for the rear guard
and Fitz Lee's brigade, which was on an unexplained mission in McClellan's
rear, had moved west of Frederick and occupied Braddock's Gap in the Catocin
Stuart himself, in the company of other officers, spent most of day of the 12th
in Frederick, at the residence of William R. Ross, a well known and wealthy
lawyer who was pro-South in sympathy. Earlier, during the rebel army's stay at
Frederick, Stuart as well as other rebel officers had frequented lawyer Ross's
house as the following narrative of one of JEB Stuart's aides, W.W. Blackford,
illustrates: "In passing through Frederick I called to take leave of my
kind friends, the Rosses, at whose house my father lived while studying law in
Mr. Ross's office. . . I had called to see them several times since crossing
the Potomac. . . (On the 12th) [w]e had a
cavalry engagement in the streets. . . One of the ladies at Mr. Ross's at the
last moment ran out as we were taking leave under skirmish fire. . . ."
Heros Von Borcke writes of the
time dinner on the 12th: "General Stuart rode with his staff into Frederick where we had
been invited by several prominent citizens to dine."
afternoon of the 12th, after the skirmish with Union cavalry in the Frederick streets, Stuart
vacated the place in the company of Von Brocke and went into the MiddletownValley.
JEB Stuart had the opportunity, after September 10th, to lose McClellan's copy
of Lee's order in the field where it was found by Private Mitchell; and when
examples of Stuart's written messages from the field are compared to
McClellan's copy, it is not surprising to see the writings probably match.
Making side-by-side comparisons,
the similarities between the writings are striking: written in pencil like
McClellan's copy of the order, the messages hyphenate the word
"tomorrow," and the characteristics of the writing, such as flow,
smoothness, and pen impulse movements, coupled with the writer's habit of
interlining mistakes, all suggest that it is more probable than not that they
all were written by the same hand.
three circumstances support the conclusion that Stuart wrote McClellan's copy
from some place other than the confines of Lee's headquarters camp. First, the
writer of McClellan's copy, in writing the September date of the order, wrote
first the number "1," not the number "9." He then corrected
the date, not by using an eraser, but by interlining. Next to the marked over
number "1," the writer then wrote the number "9." This
suggests that Stuart wrote the text of McClellan's copy sometime after September
9th. Second, side by side comparison of Marshall's copy and Chilton's letterbook
copy (written in A.P. Mason's hand) with D.H. Hill's copy (written in Jackson's
hand) and McClellan's copy show that McClellan's copy was copied from
Jackson's, not Marshall's or Mason's. The former two copies use the same phrase
"in intercepting the retreat" in paragraph six; the latter two
copies use the same phrase "and intercept the retreat" in
paragraph six. Either Stuart copied McClellan's copy from Jackson's, or Jackson copied his from Stuart's. Last, of
all the known messages, letters, and orders that came out of Lee's headquarters
during the Antietam campaign, none of them
contains the stationer's embossed stamp that is found in the upper left hand
corner of McClellan's copy. Nor is this stamp found on any of JEB Stuart's public
writings. Therefore, the paper Stuart used probably came from a civilian
likely source of Stuart's access to this unique paper is the Frederick lawyer, William Ross. The
stationer's stamp identifies the paper of McClellan's copy as manufactured by
the Platner & Porter Manufacturing Co. of Farmington, Connecticut.
This company was in business manufacturing such paper from 1848 to about 1880.
According to Jesse R. Lankford, Jr, North
Carolina's State Archivist, this paper was routinely
used by North Carolina's
civil war government and reams of it can be found in the state archives. At the
Virginia Historical Society, in Richmond,
Virginia, several hundred pages
of this paper can be found, comprising an original manuscript written by
General Lee's eldest son, Custis Lee, in 1867.
And Platner & Porter paper was used by Walt Whitman in his 1862 notebook as
he followed the Union Army to Antietam.
Of the several size types of Platner & Porter paper, one was marketed as
"Lawyer's Cap" and the paper might well have been available to Stuart
through his contact with William Ross.
if Stuart wrote McClellan's copy, how was it dropped on the ground at Frederick? Since Stuart
was still at Frederick
as late as the afternoon of the 12th, it is possible that he could have dropped
the order and cigars in the field at that time, anticipating that the
troops of Reno's
corps would find it.
Stephen W. Sears, in his last word on the subject, takes the position that the discovery
of Special Order 191 "represented the workings of pure chance"—that
the order and the cigars "could just as easily have been overlooked as it
lay in that clover field." From this logic Sears argues that the order's
finding was as much an accident as its loss.
An alternative, though, that Sears's logic suggests, is that the order had to
be lost under circumstances which guaranteed it would be found.
Stuart was forced from Frederick
the afternoon of the 12th it hardly would have seemed certain to him that his
dropping of the order would result in its being found by on the 13th. From the point of view of a
person in his shoes, the idea of dropping the order to the ground in the face
of the oncoming horde of Burnside's soldiers, horses, cattle, wagons and
artillery, would be silly. There was only one sure way of guaranteeing that the
dropping of the order would be discovered and that was to drop it in the
presence of the soldiers who were to find it.
person was by which this was done the evidence does not exactly say. But that a
civilian could easily have planted it in the vicinity of Company's F's stacking
of arms the evidence does say: for, "[t]he town jubilantly welcomed the
liberators. `Handkerchiefs are waved, flags are thrown from Union houses, and a
new life infused into the people,'. . . The troops responded with volleys of
cheering, and regimental bands blared martial music. . . `the place was alive
with girls going around the streets in squads waving flags, singing songs and
inviting the soldiers in for hot supper. . . [T]he next day (the 13th) the
people began to cook for us, bringing out as we passed, cake, pie and bread.' .
. . It was like a gigantic Fourth of July celebration. . . ."
And, in the excitement, someone walked by Mitchell and let fall from his hand
the folded paper of the order wrapped around cigars.
issue of this had been raised at the time, a prime suspect might well have been
the Reverend Doctor, John B. Ross. Before assuming the pastorate of Frederick's First
Presbyterian Church, in 1856, Dr. Ross had pastored for several years in Roanoke, Virginia,
and was personally acquainted with Stonewall Jackson. According to Henry Kyd
Douglas, one of Jackson's
met privately with Ross at the church Manse the morning of September 10th.
In a manuscript the UNC Press used to publish I Rode With Stonewall, in
1940, Douglas had written—"The General
was anxious, before leaving Frederick,
to see the Reverend Dr. Ross, a personal friend, and I took him to the
Two weeks after the battle of Antietam, Dr.
Ross resigned his position as pastor and left Frederick and never returned. As the church's
historians have reported it, during September 1862 "Rev. Ross was visited
by his personal friend, Stonewall Jackson. In (October) 1862, the work of
pastoring became so difficult and discouraging for Dr. Ross that he gave it
on the 10th at lawyer Ross's home, Stuart could have copied the order on the
Platner & Porter paper and, after Jackson
paved the way, given it to Dr. Ross on the 12th and, on the 13th as Private
Mitchell was stacking arms, Ross could have strolled across the field and
3.The Truth of History Revealed?
General Lee intentionally lose his order, or was it an accident as the
historians and civil war writers generally say? To answer the question, one
must rely on the evidence which has more convincing force than that opposed to
it. Here, the tactical realities of the ground, the unsworn testimony of those
witnesses most knowledgeable about the promulgation of orders, the
circumstances of the weather and the cigars, and the reasonable inferences to
be drawn from them, much less the handwriting on McClellan's copy, all converge
to point to the finding of intent as the probable truth.
discrepancies do exist in the facts, they can be reasonably reconciled in light
of the totality of known circumstances. First, because Charles Marshall
misnumbered the general movement order he wrote for General Lee as order 190,
Robert Chilton, when he signed it, would not necessarily have corrected it,
since the order he signed authorizing Walter Taylor to leave the army was
numbered 191. Second, as originally written, order 191 was, in fact, a
"special" order as defined by Confederate Regulations, because it
dealt solely with the specific detachment of Taylor from the army. In contrast, the order Marshall wrote for Lee,
numbered 190, was by its terms a "general" order since it dealt with
the movement of the entire army. Someone presented Marshall's copy of this
general order to A.P. Mason to copy into Chilton's letterbook; in doing so,
Mason was confronted with the fact that, on September 8th, he had previously
copied into the letterbook a four paragraph order labeled "Special Order
190" which authorized leaves of absences for four disabled officers.
Whether on his own initiative, or by instruction by someone, the fact is that
Mason added the text of Marshall's
order to the text of Taylor's
detachment order. Third, years later, when Davis queried him about the
promulgation of a special order issued at Frederick, Chilton remembered what a
reasonable person would probably have remembered—a special order was sent by
courier to a commander on detached duty, and since the name of D.H. Hill was
known to be recorded on McClellan's copy of Order 191, Chilton assumed the
courier had been sent to Hill; when, in fact, the courier had been sent to
Walker on the Monacacy.
it is obvious that the credibility of the key members of General Lee's personal
staff is highly suspect. In 1878, Walter Taylor was the first to write publicly
about the incident of the lost order. Taylor,
of course, could have had no personal knowledge about the issuance of the lost
order, because he had been sent to Virginia
by General Lee and did not return to Maryland
until the army had already reached Sharpsburg.
To explain the loss of the order in his book, Taylor invoked a supposed statement of
Charles Venable's; by writing—"Colonal Venable. . . says in regard to this
matter: 'This is easily explained. One copy was sent directly to Hill from
headquarters. General Jackson sent him a copy.'" Eight years later, in his
book, Memoirs of General Lee, A.L. Long repeated verbatim Taylor's quotation of
what Venable supposedly said. Clearly, by their reliance on a hearsay statement
(in Long's case, double hearsay), it is obvious that both Taylor and Long did not know from personal
knowledge that a copy of order 191 was actually sent to Hill "from
headquarters." But Taylor
thought Venable knew. Yet, inexplicitly, Charles Venable, who lived a long time
after the war, never made a public or private statement about his actual
knowledge of the matter, even though he knew Taylor and Long had invoked his name as the
one living witness who knew a copy of the order was sent to Hill from
what about Charles Marshall? Even though the historical records shows that it
was he who had been responsible for writing the official order signed by
Chilton and sent by Lee to Davis, and which was copied by Mason into Chilton's
letterbook, he never disclosed to anyone what he knew of the order being sent
to Hill. Both he and Venable wrote unpublished narratives of their experiences
as Lee's staff officers, yet both men stopped their narratives at the point Lee
moved his army into Maryland.
This fact damages the credibility of Taylor's
hearsay statement greatly, because the inference follows reasonably from the
fact of their silence that neither man could bring himself to come forward with
an account of his actual knowledge. Given the undisputed facts of the case, the
reason for this failure is obvious: they knew enough to know that, in bringing
on the battle of Antietam, General Lee had
probably used the order as a ruse of war.
had good reason to keep their mouths shut. In 1876, two years before Taylor's Four Years
with General Lee was published, Louis Phillipe d'Orleans, known as the
Comte de Paris, published the second volume of his work, History of the
Civil War in America. In it he expressed the prevailing public view that
the Battle of Antietam "was a defeat for the Confederates in the triple
view, of tactics, strategy, and politics. . . Th[e] error was in [Lee's]
dividing his forces to capture Harper's Ferry. Had he not done so he could have
fought upon SouthMountain or continued the
campaign on the upper Potomac. . . so much
blood shed to no purpose for the Confederate cause."
1876 view was shared by Major General Frederick Maurice, in 1925, when his book
Lee the Soldier was published. "I have condemned Lee's decision to
fight behind the Antietam," Maurice said,
"because no general should fight a battle which is not forced upon him
unless the chances of obtaining decisive results preponderate in his
Another important British war theorist, J.F.C. Fuller, echoed this view when he
wrote, in 1933: "The battle of Sharpsburg
was a totally unnecessary battle."
In the face of such criticism, from Marshall's and Venable's points of view,
how worse would the public perception be of Lee, if they had made known that he
intentionally used a ruse to draw McClellan into the battle? So they kept quiet
about their knowledge of the order, although Marshall was quick to challenge the
assumption that the battle was not "forced" on General Lee.
to the Comte de Paris, in 1877, Marshall
made the persuasive argument that, after the Union army's defeat at Bull Run, General Lee had to fight somewhere:
"The country around [Bull Run] within a
compass of fifty miles had been stripped by both sides, and was wholly
incapable of supporting an army. What was General Lee to do?" He wrote.
"His army could not be maintained where it was. . . it was not possible to
make a direct attack upon Washington. . . if he were [to retreat] it would be taken
as an admission. . . that he had no policy but to await such attacks as the
Federals might make."
Therefore there was nothing left for General Lee to do but move indirectly
toward the Shenandoah Valley, by moving
The Shenandoah Valley was the only place left in Northern Virginia where Lee's army could live off the
land for an extended period of time. But it could not be reached safely by
marching directly to it. The movement would be recognized by the enemy as a
retreat and it would have left roads to Richmond
undefended. Thus, General Lee had no reasonable choice but to keep up the
pretense of threatening an offensive against Washington by marching to Frederick. Once there a battle had to be
planned which carried with it the reasonable probability that the enemy's
capacity for combat might be weakened enough to make him stop fighting—at least
long enough for the Rebel Army to replenish its strength for the offensive
all else, battles are tests of military structure; the object is not merely to
kill but to disorganize. As Clausewitz has written, "Getting the better of
the enemy—that is, placing him in position where he has to break off the
engagement—cannot in itself be considered as an objective. Nothing remains,
therefore, but the direct profit gained in the process of destruction. This
gain includes not merely casualties inflicted during the action (which many
times will be equal), but also those which occur as a direct result of the
retreat. . . The really crippling losses, those the vanquished does not share
with the victor, only start with his retreat. . . Thus a victory usually only
starts to gather weight after the issue has already been decided."
But Lee denied McClellan the crucial profit of battle by the fierce tenacity of
his defense; in bringing McClellan to battle at the Antietam, Lee wrecked the
Union Army's organization and stopped it cold, gaining his objective of
freezing McClellan at the Potomac while he retreated unmolested into the haven
of the Shenandoah Valley.
D. Eisenhower, in writing of the risk he took in leaving seventy-five miles of
Allied front through the Ardennes forest weakly defended, in 1944, said this:
"At any moment from November 1  onward I could have passed to the
defensive along the whole front and made our lines absolutely secure from
attack while we waited for reinforcements. . . We remained on the offensive and
weakened ourselves where necessary to maintain those offensives. This plan gave
the German opportunity to launch his attack; if giving him the chance is to be
condemned by historians, their condemnation should be directed at me
Like Eisenhower, Lee took a calculated risk that resulted in the
sacrifice of thousands of America's
bravest youth. In both cases, the sacrifice reaped for the American commander a
great battle profit—in Eisenhower's case an ultimate overwhelming of the German
resistance at the Siegfried Line; in Lee's, his army gained time to replenish
its strength to remain on the offensive deep into 1863. General Lee's ruse of
the lost order made this possible, and it marks him, with Eisenhower, among America's
greatest men of war.
. E.B. Trent, New York
(1867); Reprint Bonanza Books,