With this book, Hess sweeps away the accumulated myths about Pickett's Charge to provide the definitive history of the engagement. Drawing on exhaustive research, especially in unpublished personal accounts, he creates a moving narrative of the attack from both Union and Confederate perspectives, analyzing its planning, execution, aftermath, and legacy. He also examines the history of the units involved, their state of readiness, how they maneuvered under fire, and what the men who marched in the ranks thought about their participation in the assault. Ultimately, Hess explains, such an approach reveals Pickett's Charge both as a case study in how soldiers deal with combat and as a dramatic example of heroism, failure, and fate on the battlefield.

I found a major virtue of the book was the manner in which Hess shifted his focus back and forth from the Confederate to the Union side of the line. The book begins with a discussion of the planning of the charge, focusing on the interactions between Lee and Longstreet. This is followed by two chapters dealing with, respectively, the disposition of the Confederate troops before the attack and the Union lines before the attack. I found this invaluable in helping me understand the events of the day and their sequence.

Hess follows this discussion with a discussion of the Confederate cannonading barrage, and the Union response, that proceeded the infantry advance. Again, he shifts his focus from the Confederate side of the line, and the effect of the cannonading on the Union, to the Union response and its effect on the Confederacy. He spends a great deal of time explaining the decision of the Union artillerists to hold their fire and the disagreement this decision provoked with General Hancock. This theme pervades the book and is well-treated. Hess concludes that the cannonading was about one hour in duration before the infantry charge,(i.e. from about 1:00p.m. to 2:00p.m.) contrary to some other accounts which make it substantially longer.

There are detailed discussions of the Confederate infantry advance to the Emmitsburg Road, to the Stone Fence, and, for a small number of intrepid southern soldiers, over the wall and into the Union lines. We learn about the Union artillery and infantry responses and about their effect on the charge at each stage.

There is an excellent but somewhat brief chapter on the repulse of the charge and on the subsequent Confederate retreat back to Virginia. There is an excellent chapter discussing the careers of the principle protagonists of the battle following the events of July 3 through the end of the War and beyond.

The book lays a great deal of emphasis on the topography of the battlefield, the hills, ridges, swales, and fences which played a major role in the fighting of July 3. But the key emphasis on the book is on the fighting men on both sides -- on their determination and their heroism. Hess argues that the activities of the troops and their immediate commanders were more important to the results of the day than the decisions of the generals.

Hess has many thoughtful things to say about the attack, its planning, and about its possibilities for success. He finds the attack a long chance indeed but is able to present a convincing case about why Lee believed he needed to try. Hess is highly critical of James Longstreet for the manner in which he deployed the attacking divisions and for his failure to provide support to the attack. But he does not believe the attack would have succeeded even if Longstreet had carried out his responsibilities more aggressively. I learned a great deal from Hess's study.

This book will help the reader understand the events of July 3. It shows why Pickett's charge, with its suffering, its folly, and its glory retains its hold on the imagination of many Americans.

Mr. Hess also does a good job in rebalancing the participation of Pettigrew's and Trimble's commands in the charge. Many accounts of this engagement focus on Picketts' Virginians, partly because these men left a better aggregate written record of their impressions, and partly as a result of post-war prowess with the pen.

There are some gaps. The account of the immediate post-charge Confederate impressions is thin. Is it due to lack of data or just lack of presentation? Does Hess credit the account found in many histories that Lee lets loose his despair that night telling John Imboden "Too bad, too bad, Oh too bad." Did that happen? Is it post-war hyperbole? The account is extant but Hess is silent about what he knows about it. You are begging for a glimpse of Longstreet's post-charge movements that night or over the next few days. Who did he talk to? Did Lee and Longstreet meet within the days following the attack? If Hess doesn't report it you are left to conclude it didn't happen, but is that an accurate conclusion? The Imboden encounter leaves doubt about how thorough the author has been.

Hess explained the storied background of the officers and men who participated in the charge. He mentions Waller Tazwell Patton, colonel of the 7th Virginia, but says nothing about his relationship to WWII's George Patton. Perhaps these ommission's are minor. If Hess sets himself such high expectations, however, the reader has the obligation to call him on it if he fails to deliver.