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All for the Regiment: The Army of the Ohio, 1861-1862 (Civil War America)
written by Gerald J. Prokopowicz
Studio : The University of North Carolina Press
by The University of North Carolina Press
Release Date : 2000-12-06
Publisher : The University of North Carolina Press
Released : 2001-06-25
Availability : Usually ships in 1-2 business days
Number of Items : 1
EAN : 9780807826263
Avg. Customer Rating: (based on 3 reviews)
List Price : $34.95
Our Price : $9.50
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Product Description |
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Despite its important role in the early years of the Civil War, the Army of the Ohio remains one of the least studied of all Union commands. With All for the Regiment, Gerald Prokopowicz deftly fills this surprising gap. He offers an engaging history of the army from its formation in 1861 to its costly triumph at Shiloh and its failure at Perryville in 1862. Prokopowicz shows how the amateur soldiers who formed the Army of the Ohio organized themselves into individual regiments of remarkable strength and cohesion. Successive commanders Robert Anderson, William T. Sherman, and Don Carlos Buell all failed to integrate those regiments into an effective organization, however. The result was a decentralized and elastic army that was easily disrupted and difficult to command--but also nearly impossible to destroy in combat. Exploring the army's behavior at minor engagements such as Rowlett's Station and Logan's Cross Roads, as well as major battles such as Shiloh and Perryville, Prokopowicz reveals how its regiment-oriented culture prevented the army from experiencing decisive results--either complete victory or catastrophic defeat--on the battlefield. Regimental solidarity was at once the Army of the Ohio's greatest strength, he argues, and its most dangerous vulnerability. |
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Short Book With A Single Message |
This book apparently is a PhD dissertation that the author has brought out, possibly with some modification, into popular history. It is short (189 pages) with 64 pages of endnotes that actually add a fair amount of scholarly information if one cares to read through them. The basic premise is that Civil War soldiers made their regiments the primary fighting unit to which they were committed and would fight for to the end if unit integrity was kept intact. The problem with the book, is that premise falls into the "duh!" category as having been recognized for eons by Civil War historians and others. It is hardly a seminal conclusion. This is not anywhere close to McPherson's "Why They Fought."
That being said, there is much good here. I will not reiterate the content -- that is covered well in the review by Durney. The good includes the mundane but critically important aspects of training at the regimental and company levels have been mostly ignored in the Civil War literature. The ability to maneuver under fire won many battles (the Wilderness comes to mind) and the lack thereof lost many (Fair Oaks for example.) The author provides a good introduction to this subject, but it needs a huge amount of fleshing out. I recommend Benjamin Scribner's work, "How Soldiers Were Made", now long out of print & difficult to find, to add to this discussion.
In my own case, although I have ancestors who fought on both side of the Civil War, my Great-grandfather's diary covering his three years fighting as a member of Company "K", 5th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry (one of the units mentioned in this work), by itself proved the author's thesis concerning the importance of the Company and Regiment, as well as training. My Great-grandfather even had "Company K, 5th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry" put on his tombstone many years later. Clearly, he identified with and was proud of his Company and Regiment, having seen action in fifty-seven battles and skirmishes. In his diary, the men were always identified as to which company they belonged.
The author could have developed his thesis further into the First and Second World Wars when the US abandoned the concept of recruiting units by area. Ultimately, personnel were scattered into units where no one knew each other before coming together. Politicians love this -- it protects them from single unit disasters that might eliminate too many of their constituents in a specific locale. The flip side is a loss in unit cohesion and fighting prowess due to unintegrated anonymous replacements arriving daily. But who ever said that politicians can accept risks? The case can be made that casualties increased, but were more palatable since they were spread more evenly across congressional districts.
At any rate, this is a fine little book that never quite provides sufficient detail to capture my attention. It can be read in a single sitting over an evening, and leaves one searching for more information on the subjects touched upon. Included in this list would be the battles of Perryville, Richmond, and Logan's Crossroads along with more detailed treatment of Buell, Nelson, Davis and the various lower-ranking officers who won and lost battles. As such I gave it only three stars -- there is much promise here, but not enough substance. |
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Flawed but Readabel |
This is a good account of the building of regiments and brigades in the early years of the war. Using the Army of the Ohio as a model, the author gives a good account of the raising, equipping and training of a regiment. This is the book's strongest point and much of its' value. If this justifies spending $37.50, is an open question. After reading the book, I'm not sure that I have an answer for you.
The Army of the Ohio's role at Shiloh is still being debated. The author comes down firmly on saving Grant's army; over the secondary role many historians assign it. The question isn't debated as much as stated with little more than a nod to the other side. This caused no little upset with the reviewer, as it contradicted other histories without providing real answers as to why.
The frustrations of campaigning between Shiloh and the invasion of Kentucky are explained. The army was used not so much as a weapon but as a construction crew. Isolated garrisons, poorly lead and badly trained were no match for the hard riding raiders of Morgan and Forrest. Both of these men built reputations at the expense of this army. The author manages to show how decisions made months before caused many of the problems at this time. Political appointees do not make a regimental commander or a fighter. More than one surrender caused army wide embarrassment and strained the fragile ties between units.
Bragg's invasion of Kentucky, the political implications and the impact on the 1862 election are not developed. Neither is a good explanation of the battle of Perryville provided. Without reading Noe's excellent book, I'm not sure you can understand what is going on. This is the weakest part of the book and the most vital, as the army is really tested during this time. The army passed this test, if not with flying colors at least with a clear victory. How much Bragg contributed to this victory isn't talked about either, leaving another hole in the book. The Kentucky Campaign of 1862 is one of the worst offensive operations the CSA mounted. Plagued by divisions in leadership, fuzzy thinking and unrealistic expectations "Kentucky fever" came to a crashing halt from Frankfort to Richmond. The battle of Perryville is a confused, chaotic battle with little direction by either commander. The failure of Union leadership is covered but the failure of Confederate leadership isn't mentioned. This cheats Bragg, as major problems caused by Smith and Polk may have caused the failure more than the poor decisions on his part.
Missing is a detailed account of Jefferson C. Davis killing William Nelson. This event, where Davis gets away with murder, and the impact it had on the army prior to Perryville deserves a book. In addition, the relief of Buell on the eve of the Perryville campaign is hardly mentioned. George Thomas' refusal to assume command and the impact on him aren't covered either.
Over all is Don Carlos Buell, commander of the Army of the Ohio. "Don Carlos" was a McClellan supporter but lacked his style and ability to build bridges to his men. However, he shared the soft war ideas and enforced a policy of appeasement that turned the army against him. Nothing Buell did worked, as it should have within his army. He built strong regiments but never managed to build higher formations. His appointments didn't work out but Buell either kept them in position or assigned them more responsibility. These generals usually failed at a critical point in a battle or managed to really upset the men. Both contributed to Buell's problems, which he seems unable to recognize and/or address. Always asking for more, unwilling to take real risks and saddled with a Washington priority in loyalist Eastern Tennessee; Buell cannot command and reacts to McClellan, Halleck and Lincoln. Over showed by Grant, Don Carlos has become a forgotten man. He missed every major battle his army fought in. Failed to understand the change in direction the war was taking and refused to implement the new policies. Unable to hear the battle at Perryville, Buell sits and fumes about the waste of cannon ammunition but send no office forward to investigate. Removed from command, Buell is left to justify his actions in the face of life long hostility from his veterans.
This is a very readable and enjoyable book. The author writes well, keeps the story moving and supports his points. I didn't find the size of the book to be a problem or get the feeling that the story was truncated either. Most of the book is on good solid historical ground. The earlier battles are well done and provide the stepping-stones to the larger battles to come. However the author never gets a grip on these large battles. This is the place where the size of the book might become a problem. An additional hundred pages could have give the coverage Shiloh and Perryville need and added one or more stars to the review.
In the end William Stark Rosecrans, fresh from Mississippi, assumes command and the Army of the Ohio becomes the Army of the Cumberland. Larry J. Daniel's book "Days of Glory" for $44.95 is a much better and more complete history.
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A Focused, Original Perspective on the Army of the Ohio |
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This book is focused and trenchant, and it succeeds in illuminating some basic questions (the 'how's and 'why's of Civil War army dynamics, and how they affected the flow of battles), and best of all it raises many interesting points, and leaves the reader thinking anew. It is an interesting dichotomy that the story is of discreet regiments and companies of the Army of the Ohio 'formed into a blunt instrument', and that Buell and his key commanders remain indispensible elements in the story. The army commander's and officers' struggle to fulfill their true roll (drill the troops in a systematic way, create and encourage espirit de corps for the army, and of course - develop a plan of campaign and act - with alacrity!) seems to be a sub-theme of the entire book. Another re-curring theme is the power of perception - the strength that the Army of the Ohio drew from their steady diet of success up until Perryville. Casual readers of this or that battle account from that war become de-sensitized to the big numbers (30,000 troops, or 60,000, or 100,000...and casualties in the thousands after single engagements) and maybe never give any thought at all to the enormously complex enterprise of creating such an army, and supplying it, and manuevering it; let alone bringing it to bear and fighting it in an effective way. This book includes interesting accounts of the battles at Shiloh and Perryville, and of an epic march between Nashville and Louisville as it happened to the Army of the Ohio. |
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