In a brilliantly constructed and powerfully rendered new account, James R. Arnold offers a penetrating analysis of Grant's strategies and actions leading to the Union victory at Vicksburg. Approaching these epic events from a unique and well-rounded perspective, and based on careful research, Grant Wins the War is fascinating reading for all Civil War and military history buffs.

Acclaim for Grant Wins the War

Nicely details the coordination of Union military and naval operations and the boldness and genius of General U. S. Grant that brought Union victory, and he offers an excellent discussion of the technology and tactics of siege warfare. . . . a good drums-and-bugle account of an important event.?Library Journal

A particular strength of this work is its demonstration that modern weapons left no shortcuts to victory, and little room for command virtuosity.?Publishers Weekly

Throughout, Arnold backs up his assessments with solid facts and sound reasoning, engagingly presented. He has produced a useful and enjoyable brief history of the Vicksburg campaign, helpful to scholars and general readers alike.?Journal of Military History

Powerfully and persuasively argues that the Union victory at Vicksburg in 1863 was in fact the actual turning point of the Civil War.?Helena (Mont.) Independent Record

Arnold's descriptions of the battles were interesting with notes on individual bravery without becoming too bogged down in details. Particularly interesting were the descriptions of the Union army's march on the Louisiana side of the Mississippi River and the Union navy's several attempts to pass by Vicksburg's siege guns.

I also appreciated the author's balanced criticisms of leaders on both sides:
1) Pemberton, the Confederate commander, was too vacillating and involved in the petty politics that doomed the Confederacy in the West. Conflict between Confederate leaders Johnston, Davis, and Beauregard further doomed Pemberton.
2)Grant made the inexcusable mistake of leaving his own wounded on the battlefield after a charge on the Vicksburg works because of his faulty perception that to care for his wounded would be an admission of weakness.

My main complaints were the lack of sufficient maps - while the maps in the book were well-drawn and sufficiently detailed, more were needed, particularly for a campaign such as Vicksburg.

In conclusion, I recommend the book as an entertaining and informative read on an important campaign.

Grant's amazing victory was as much politically as tactically driven. From the point of view of Grant's career, he had to win, had to take unorthodox chances, because he was as close to being dead meat as any Union general ever came. For months and months he was bogged down before Vicksburg. We know Lincoln was so dissatisfied with Grant that he sent Charles Dana to Vicksburg as the President's special envoy to see what was really going on.

General Banks, a Lincoln political appointee and very close friend, was driving north from Baton Rouge toward Port Gibson and Vicksburg. Banks stalled and Grant was ordered by Halleck (via Lincoln??) to assist Banks. Grant disobeyed this command from the then General in Chief of all Federal armies and went his own way. WOW! Big decision. What a way to make friends when you are under the looking glass.

Last, placed within Grant's command structure is another Lincoln political appointee and friend, General McClernand, who Grant subsequently relieves prior to Vicksburg's capitulation. Is he thumbing he nose?

At Vicksburg we see Grant's first inclination to tactically detach himself from direct supply and communication lines. But what caused it? Was it Pemberton's chauvinistic defense of Vicksburg and Grant's straight forward desire to defeat his foe? Or was it the internal pressure within the Union army and Grant's desire to save his career that forced Grant to do very, very differently from then current military principals, causing him to develop this amazingly different set of operational plans he would resort to again and again during the remainder of the war?

Last, from the Confederate side there is Jeff Davis' incredible stupidity. Did Jeff Davis hang Joe Johnston out to dry? And lets not forget Pemberton's direct disobedience to his theater commander's, Joe Johnston's order: Save the army, abandon Vicksburg. Why did Jeff Davis never censure Pemberton not only for the loss of Vicksburg, strategically and psychologically important to the South as it was, but also the loss of an entire army, complete with thousands of men and irreplaceable stores, arms and ammunition? And why does Davis again relieve Johnston from command, not reinstating him until the final hours of the war?

Seen simply from the viewpoint of the Union high command, i.e., a traitor in his midst (McClernand), a presidential spy at headquarters (Dana), an unwillingness to unite forces with a fellow field commander (Banks) and the disobedience of his direct superior's orders (Halleck's), Grant should be thankful for Lincoln's reaffirmed evaluation of him: "I cannot spare this man; he fights". Good for you, Charles Dana.

Grant's military victory at Vicksburg IS amazing and this book is as good an account of it as there is. But the author fails to live up to his title's claim. Grant's political coup (Lincoln's willing recognition of his ability despite his incredible disobedience and non cooperation with Lincoln favorites) is even more incredulous than his military one. Had not Meade just beaten Lee at Gettysbury on the very same day that Vicksburg fell? Which would have been of more immediate importance: a captured Confederate army on the Mississippi River or a victorious Confederate army next door to Washington? If Lee had won at Gettysburg, Vicksburg would have been what it will always be, a spectacular feat of arms. But Union army and Northern political concerns aside, maybe, just maybe, Jeff Davis and Robert E. Lee lost the war that fateful day when they made the conscious decision to risk swapping Vicksburg for Washington and lost their gamble on both counts.

The most important item to come from the Vicksburg conflict was not Grant's victory as much as it was Lincoln's recognition of Grant as his next General in Chief. And in that vein it was not Grant's victory at Vicksburg but Lincoln's subsequent promotion of Grant over Meade that won the war.

But like the title, a little too grandoise in its assertions. Grant's amazing victory was as much politically as tactically driven. Here we see Grant's first indclination to detach himself from direct supply and communication lines. But what caused it? Was it Pemberton's chauvenistic defense of Vicksburg (and Grant's straight forward desire to defeat his foe) or was it the internal pressure within the Union army (forcing Grant to do very, very differently from then current military principals)that caused him to develop this amazingly different set of operational plans he would resort to again and again during the remainder of the War?

Prior to this victory, Grant, as a general, was probably as much at risk to continuing his command as any time subsequent in his military career. He had horrifically bogged down at Vicksburg. General Banks, Lincoln political appointee and close friend of Lincoln's, is driving North from Baton Rouge. He is stalled outside Port Gibson and Grant is ordered by Hallack (via Lincoln??)to assist him. Grant disobeys this command from the then General in Chief of all Federal armies and goes his own way. WOW! Big decision.

Also, within his command structure is another Lincoln political appointee, General McClernand, who Grant relieves prior to Vickburg's capitulation.

Last, there is Jeff Davis' incredible stupidity (did he hang Joe Johnston out to dry)and Pemberton's direct disobedience to his theater commander's, Joe Johnston's order; save the army, abandon Vicksburg. Why did Jeff Davis never censure Pemberton not only for the loss of Vicksburg, strategically and psycologically important to the South as it was, but also an entire army, complete with thousands of men, stores, arms and ammunition? And why does Davis again relieve Johnston from command, not reinstating him until the final hours of the war?

Seen simply from the viewpoint of the Union high command,i.e., a traitor in his midst, McClernand, an unwillingness to unite forces with a fellow field commander, Banks, and the disobedience of his direct superior's orders, Halleck's,he should be thankful for Linclon's non military, non political eveluation of him: "I cannot spare this man; he fights".

Grant's military victory at Vicksburg is amazing. But his political victory (Lincoln's willing recognition of his ability despite his incredible disobedience)is even more incredulous.

The books limitation is Arnold's almost infatuation with Grant and the need to make Vicksburg the pivotal battle of the war. While the strategy that Grant utilized was daring and unorthodox that does not substantiate the comparison with Napoleon. There is nothing in the campaign that demonstrates that Grant's tactics were Napoleonic in nature.

Whether Vicksburg was the pivotal battle of the civil was may be true. However, Arnold did not make the case that it was. A Union loss at Gettysburg surley would have had a dramatic impact on the Unions will to continue the war. While the issue of which battle was more important was not important to the Vicksburg story, once the issue was raised Arnold should have at least spent more than a moment discussing Gettysburg.

As a story about the Vicksburg Campaign, the book excells.