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George B. Mcclellan: The Young Napoleon
written by Stephen W. Sears
Studio : Da Capo Press
by Da Capo Press
Publisher : Da Capo Press
Released : 1999-05-06
Availability : Usually ships in 1-2 business days
Number of Items : 1
EAN : 9780306809132
Avg. Customer Rating: (based on 13 reviews)
List Price : $19.95
Our Price : $11.76
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Product Description |
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By age 35, General George B. McClellan (1826–1885), designated the "Young Napoleon," was the commander of all the Northern armies. He forged the Army of the Potomac into a formidable battlefield foe, and fought the longest and largest campaign of the time as well as the single bloodiest battle in the nation's history. Yet, he also wasted two supreme opportunities to bring the Civil War to a decisive conclusion. In 1864 he challenged Abraham Lincoln as the Democratic candidate for the presidency. Neither an indictment nor an apologia, this biography draws entirely on primary sources to create a splendidly incisive portrait of this charismatic, controversial general who, for the first eighteen months of the conflict, held the fate of the union in his unsteady hands. |
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The Great Fizzle |
Has anyone of so much purported skill and promise failed so spectacularly at such a critical moment in American history as General George B. McClellan? If there is, I can't imagine who it would be. Douglas MacArthur comes to mind as a possible analogue (indeed, Harry Truman turned to Lincoln's dealing with McClellan for inspiration in dealing with MacArthur), but at least MacArthur ultimately prevailed in the Pacific in WWII and can at least point to Inchon as a moment of triumph.
This biography is heralded as scrupulously balanced and fair. If so, few actors on such a large stage have had so few redeeming qualities, the fascist and communist dictators of the twentieth century included. The man that Stephen Sears describes is incorrigible - there is no other word for it. Sears paints a portrait of a fool. Several Union generals matched wits and nerve with Robert E. Lee and suffered humiliating defeat, but such men as Ambrose Burnside were, at least, self-aware. They recognized the enormity of their task, felt inadequate, but pressed ahead to the greatest of their ability to fulfill their duty. McClellan, as Sears portrays him, was delusional. His arrogance and conceit were colossal. As he stumbled from one miscue to the next - and the Lincoln administration fretted over how to prod their field general into action - McClellan was convinced that history would confirm his genius and place him in the pantheon of military greats. Not American military greats, mind you, but alongside the likes of Napoleon, Caesar, and Hannibal.
The only positive things that Sears has to say about McClellan is that he was not disloyal to the Union (he was committed to seeing re-union as a precondition to peace with the South, but disagreed vehemently with the Emancipation Proclamation), he never intentionally contributed to the defeat of another Union general, such as Pope at Second Manassas, and he had a loving and tender relationship with his wife. Beyond that, this biography is essentially an indictment of McClellan's military conduct at the head of the Army of the Potomac and his character as a military officer and human being.
What this biography fails to do is explain why so many people - from the front ranks of business, politics and the military - thought so highly of McClellan, so consistently and for so long. McClellan was one of the highest paid railroad executives in the country while in his early 30s. He received the vigorous patronage, as Sears describes it, of Jefferson Davis when he was secretary of war in the Pierce administration and Salmon Chase when he was secretary of the treasury in the Lincoln administration, but Sears never describes how or why those relationships developed or why those men had such confidence in McClellan. When the Civil War broke out, the governors of the three largest states in the Union - New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio - all turned to McClellan as their first pick to lead their state militias. McClellan clearly had the ability to impress intelligent and experienced men - the type of men one would expect to be good judges of talent and character - yet the reader gets no sense of this from the Sears biography. Moreover, for all of the failure and hardship endured by the Army of the Potomac while under McClellan's command, the rank-and-file largely remained loyal to the general, often enthusiastically so.
Sears emphasizes several themes throughout the biography. First, McClellan had utter disdain for civilian control of the military and the performance of non-regulars in the army, an opinion that emerged during his early days of service in Mexico and that he carried, unaltered, through the Civil War and to his grave. Second, McClellan harbored a personal animus against his superior, Abraham Lincoln. He felt that Lincoln was his social and intellectual inferior (McClellan regularly referred to Lincoln as "the gorilla" in his correspondence with his wife), and resented the commander-in-chief's meddling in military matters. Third, Sears argues that McClellan was paralyzed by the unknown and unexpected. If a maneuver met with unanticipated resistance or a plan seemed to go awry, McClellan's impulse was to freeze and react to enemy movements. Sears frequently contrasts McClellan's timidity with Lee's flexibility in the face of regular surprises and setbacks. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Sears stresses how badly the Army of the Potomac intelligence apparatus, run by Allan Pinkerton, failed to understand the order of battle of the Confederate Army of Virginia. Throughout McClellan's tenure as commander, the general belief was that the Union troops were outnumbered by as much as two-to-one, when the reverse was usually the case. The catastrophic intelligence failure of the Union (and McClellan's eagerness to believe the inflated numbers) raises the question: if McClellan had accurate intelligence on Confederate numbers, would it have changed his behavior and battle plans? Sears never addresses that question directly, but one can anticipate his response: no, it wouldn't have changed anything.
Political scientists Eliot Cohen and John Gooch argue in "Military Misfortunes" that readers should be suspicious of the "man-in-the-dock" explanation to failure on the battlefield. In short, large scale military failure is rarely the result of one man's actions (or inactions). Yet, it seems to me that McClellan has been squarely put in the dock by history for the failures of the Union forces on the Peninsula and for not destroying the Army of Virginia at Antietam after receiving Special Order 191. Is that fair? This biography suggests that the answer is "yes," but I'm not convinced. I'm no fan of McClellan, but there had to be more to this man than Sears conveys here.
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George B. McClellan |
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Stephen W. Sears proves once again that he is a master of Civil War histories. A must ead for students of America's greatest conflect. |
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McClellan the Self-Defeatist |
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Billed as neither an indictment nor an apologia, Sears makes it pretty plain that George B. McClellan was a failure as a military leader. Overly cautious, slow to act, seeing the worst in every situation, McC was probably his own worst enemy. It's easy to see why so many of the soldiers liked him, though: fighting with McC meant there was a good chance you wouldn't see much action and if you did it was with the utmost planning for the soldiers' safety and well-being. He always thought he was outnumbered by the enemy and let opportunities for victory slip quickly through his fingers. Sears makes the point that McC always planned his campaigns and battles as if facing an overwhelming enemy force, and in that regard they were superb plans. Unfortunately, that wasn't the way it was on the field. Antietam probably should have been McC's best chance to destroy Lee's army and perhaps end the war then and there, but he squandered every opportunity and left a third of his army in reserve. Even worse, and what surely makes the man detestable, was his tremendous ego and feelings of self-importance. Sears' biography covers McC's entire life, though 90% of it deals with the Civil War years. Well written and interesting. |
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"Little Mac", warts and all..... |
History and historians have, on the whole, not been very kind to Major General George B. McClellan. Lately a trend, or better, the beginning of a trend, can be discerned in Civil War historiography towards a kinder view of McClellan. I'm referring to books like: "McClellan's War" by professor Ethan S. Rafuse, the book on McClellan by professor Thomas Rowland and to the 3 books on the Army of the Potomac by Russell Beatie.
All these books are very good and offer many valuable insights.
Yet I remain convinced that the reputation of George B. McClellan is quite beyond saving and that that there is only one man who comes in for the lion's share of blame for this: George B. McClellan.
On the plus side, and this has to be acknowledgded, McClellan never got near enough credit for his greatest achievement: he MADE the Army of the Potomac. He really did, and it was a magnificent job, considering the time he had to do it in.
So often we read about McClellan: "oh well he was a great organizer, but a very bad general" but that -unfairly- belittles his tremendous skills in that respect. So more kudos to McClellan for that. It is very, very hard to organize, to build, to equip arm, feed and clothe an army, and then to train and drill it in preparation for it's deadly work. Then of course there was another task: he had to select it's leaders, from the senior command level on down. Don't think to lightly about this. McClellan did so superbly. He gave men like John Gibbon, George Meade, Henry Hunt, Rufus Ingalls, John Buford, Winfield Scott Hancock, John Sedgewick, Charles Griffin and Andrew Humphreys their first commands on brigade level.
He should never have led it out to fight himself, though, his beloved Army of the Potomac. He was distinctly unqualified for that. I think that deep down inside of him, he was aware of this, read his correspondance (also compiled in a magnificent book by Stephen Sears, buy it!!!): his letters offer a case-study of a man plagued by insecurities, complexes and paranoia.
mr. Sears comes down hard on McClellan, very hard. But the points he argues are correct: McClellan was singularly unfit to lead an army.
Yet he was so boastful and arrogant that he put himself first and the Union war effort second, as is witnessed by his behaviour during the interlude in august 1862, when Major General John Pope commanded half of MacClellan's army aginst Lee. McClellan preferred to let Pope (who possessed as annoying a personality and as large an ego as McClellan) be beaten by Lee than come to his aid.
By then Lincoln was don with him: he let McClellan lead the army for the Antietam campaign, in order to drive Lee from Mary land, but when McClellan again started whining and dragging his feet he fired him.
"Alas, my poor country"McClellan wrote his wife after his removal from command. Alas indeed: the war was to last another two and a half years, while he could have ended it in one day, had he not so utterly mismanaged the battle of Antietam.
That is McClellan's enduring bequest to his country: two and a half more years of war.
What baffles me is this: why wasn't he brought to account for this in his own time??? Instead he was honoured, admired and even nominated for the Presidency in 1864!!!
McClellan lost the 1864 election to Lincoln, thank God. Had he won the world would not have been the same: maybe America would still be split in two countries: the USA and the CSA, or the Civil War would have restarted and be contested with even more bitterness and more ruinous consequences for the nations after his presidential term, or even terms.
Why he was not impeached, tried or court-martialled after his inept campaign in september and october 1862 is a question I ask myself. Surely others must have too?
Lincoln should have made McClellan Quartermaster-General in Chief of the Union army and put him in charge of supply, armament, recruitment, equipment and training. That was what he was good at. He would have been the Union's Lazare Carnot: "the Organizer of Victory" of the French Revolution. There is litle doubt in my mind he would have done a very good job.
A solid biography on this remarkable man. Well done Stephen W. Sears!!! Keep 'em coming. |
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GBM was a punk. |
I'd like to knock some sense into this little brat General.
Lee rules Dixie! Long Live the South. |
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